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Three experiments are reported in which subjects learn propositions 
like A hippie is in the park. The experiments manipulate the number of 
such propositions involving a particular person (e.g., hippie) or a par- 
ticular location (e.g., park). After learning the material, subjects are asked 
to judge whether particular probe propositions are from the study set. 
Times to make these judgments about probe propositions increase with 
the number of study propositions involving the person or location used in 
the probe proposition. A model is presented which assumes a subject simul- 
taneously accesses memory from all concepts in a probe proposition and 
serially searches through all study propositions involving each concept. 
Search of memory terminates as soon as one search process from a concept 
finds the probe proposition or exhausts the study propositions attached to 
that concept. 
This paper is concerned with how propositional information is re- 
trieved from long-term memory. Three variations will be reported on a 
basic experimental design in which a subject commits simple facts to 
memory and then is asked to retrieve them. These experiments are similar 
in some respects to the semantic memory experiments of Collins and 
Quillian ( 1972), L an d auer and Meyer ( 1972), Loftus ( 1973), Meyer 
( 1970), Rips, Shoben, and Smith ( 1973), and Schaeffer and Wallace 
(1970). In a typical semantic memory experiment the subject is pre- 
sented with a proposition (for example, A canary has skin) and must 
determine whether it is true. One reasonable model for such a task would 
analyze it as involving an implicit syllogism. That is, the subject retrieves 
relevant propositions from memory (i.e., A canary is an animal and 
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Animals have skin) and with these he logically determines the truth of 
the original assertion. This paper looks at the simpler task of answering 
the question of whether a test proposition resides in memory rather than 
of whether a test proposition is implied by other propositions residing in 
memory. 
Recently, there has been a surge of interest in how propositional in- 
formation is represented in long-term memory (i.e., Anderson & Bower, 
1973; Kintsch, 1972; Quillian, 1969; Rumelhart, Lindsay, & Norman, 
1972). A proposition is defined as an abstract memory representation 
which is structured according to certain rules of formation and which 
has a truth value. Although propositions are asserted by English sen- 
tences, propositions are not sentences nor are they made out of words. 
Rather, a proposition is a more abstract entity composed of concepts 
referenced by words. This distinction between propositions and concepts 
on the one hand and sentences and words on the other is at the heart of 
all propositional models of long-term memory. 
Subjects in these experiments learned simple sentences like A hippie 
is in the park. It is assumed subjects store the sentences as propositions 
and not as strings of semantically unrelated words. There is no hard 
experimental evidence to support this assumption, but all subjects 
claimed to treat the sentences as meaning-bearing entities. There were 
frequent reports of imagery and semantic elaborations of the propositions. 
Most subjects claimed to have created for themselves a fictional world 
of people and places. More than one subject joked after an experimental 
session that he felt he was leaving old friends. 
First, I will present the details of the three experiments and their re- 
sults. In these experiments some important trends will appear. The three 
experiments were performed to test how reliable these trends were 
under various relevant changes of experimental conditions. After present- 
ing the experiments, I will present a retrieval model that predicts the 
principal trends in the data. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
In these experiments subjects learn a large number of facts of the 
form : 
A hippie is in the park. 
A hippie is in the church. 
A policeman is in the park. 
A sailor is in the park. 
They are then asked whether a particular proposition is among the desig- 
nated set of facts. This situation raises interesting questions. For instance, 
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will the time to verify a particular proposition about a concept like 
hippie increase with the total number of propositions the subject knows 
about hippie? If so, should the same effect be obtained for other concepts 
in the proposition like the location park? The parallel activation model 
of Quillian (1969) would predict no effect of number of propositions for 
any concept. In this model, retrieval time is independent of the number 
of alternative facts that must be considered about a concept. Another 
plausible retrieval scheme is that subjects serially search through all 
propositions about the subject of a sentence looking for the target propo- 
sition. This model would predict an effect of the number of propositions 
involving the subject but not of the number of propositions involving 
other elements such as the locations in the above sentences. These are 
fundamental issues bearing on how long-term memory is organized and 
accessed. Experiment 1 was performed to get some preliminary data to 
help make a choice between alternative models. 
Method 
Materials. Subjects first committed to memory a data base of 26 sen- 
tences of the form A person is in the location. The sentences could be 
classified according to the total number of sentences involving the person 
(1, 2, or 3) and the number of sentences involving the location (1, 2, 
or 3). Sentences were created to realize all nine combinations of these 
two dimensions. The 3 X 3 matrix at the top of Table 1 indicates the 
assignment of the 26 sentences to conditions. Each sentence is repre- 
sented by two letters, a lower-case letter for the person, and an upper- 
case letter for the location. Repetition of the same letter in a number of 
letter pairs means the same word occurred in a number of sentences. 
The persons (lower case letters) occur uniquely in the sentences of 
column 1, twice in column 2, and three times in column 3. A similar 
pattern of repetitions occurs for locations across the three rows. 
After learning these sentences, subjects entered a reaction-time phase 
of the experiment in which they were asked to judge whether particular 
probe sentences came from the designated set of 26 sentences. Sentences 
in the designated set are called true and those not in the designated set 
are called false. False probe sentences were created by re-pairing persons 
and locations. Just as the trues, false sentences could be classified into 
nine conditions depending on how many originally presented (true) 
sentences involved the person (1, 2, or 3) used in the probe, and how 
many involved the location (1, 2, or 3) used in the probe. The physical 
sentences serving particular true or false conditions were counterbalanced 
over subjects so that each sentence served in all nine conditions. Because 
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materials vary with subjects, generalizing statistically across subjects will 
not involve the language-as-fixed-effects fallacy (see Clark, 1973). 
In the study sentences, some words had to occur more frequently than 
others. To avoid having this frequency confound carry-over into the 
reaction-time phase, a set of nine of the sentences were chosen for special 
testing. Within that set of nine there were nine unique persons and nine 
unique locations. The nine sentences used are displayed schematically 
at the bottom of Table 1. From these nine trues, 18 falses were created 
by re-pairing the nine persons and nine locations. These falses are also 
displayed at the bottom of Table 1. Note that one true and two falses 
can be classified into each of the nine conditions defined by number 
of propositions per person and number of propositions per location. 
These conditions are referred to by a pair of numbers i-i, where i is the 
number of propositions per person and i is the number of propositions 
per location. 
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The reaction-time tests consisted of three blocks of 50 trials or 150 
trials in all. In each block of 50, the 9 trues were tested twice each and 
the 18 falses once. Thus, the nine persons and nine locations occurred 
four times, twice in trues and twice in falses. They did not occur in any 
of the remaining 14 filler sentences in a block of 50. These sentences 
were composed by randomly re-pairing the seven persons and the seven 
locations not used in the basic trues and falses. The purpose of these 
filler sentences was to help keep active the subject’s memory for all the 
material. The reaction times from these filler sentences were not analyzed. 
The order of sentences in each block of 50 was randomized. 
The counterbalancing of sentences across conditions was accomplished 
by assigning different physical sentences to the schemes for different sub- 
jects. This was done by changing some of the sentences a subject studied. 
So, A hippie is in the park might fulfill the uA schema for one subject, 
the i.I schema for another subject, and so on. For the first subject, park 
would be A and would only serve in one proposition; but for the second 
subject, park would be the J and serve in two propositions (i.e., i.7 and 
gJ). Note that by manipulating assignment of true sentences to schemata, 
assignment of false sentences to schemata is also manipulated. Nine dis- 
tinct study sets were created to complete the counterbalancing. 
Procedure. The experiment consisted of two principal phases: a learn- 
ing phase in which the 26 sentences were committed to memory and a 
reaction-time phase in which subjects judged whether probe sentences 
were members of the designated set. During the learning phase, the 
subjects first studied the sentences at a self-paced rate. They were told 
to “try to understand fully the meaning of these sentences because this 
is the best way to remember them.” After studying the sentences, the 
subject’s memory was checked by having him recite answers to ques- 
tions of the form Who is in the park? and Where are the hippies? One 
question was constructed for each of the 16 persons used in the data 
base and one was constructed for each of the I6 locations. So all to- 
gether there were 32 questions which were presented to the subject in 
random order. The sentences were very imperfectly learned after the 
initial study and subjects made many errors. When they made errors in 
this training phase, they were told the correct answer. Questions to which 
the subject could recall the correct answers were dropped out of the 
set. After one pass through the set, subjects were cycled through those 
questions that remained. This continued until there were no questions 
left. Then all 32 questions were randomized and the subject started all 
over. This continued until the subject could correctly answer all 32 ques- 
tions in a row. This training session ranged from 20 min to I hr. 
After the subject could recite answers perfectly to these questions, 
456 JOHN ROBERT ANDERSON 
the reaction-time (RT) test phase of the experiment commenced. The 
subject was shown a sentence of the form A person is in the location and 
he had to judge whether it was true or false. The sentences were back- 
projected on a screen before the subject by a Carousel slide projecter 
with an electronic shutter. Reaction times were measured from the open- 
ing of the shutter (projecting the sentence) to the depression of one of 
two response buttons. The subjects were instructed to respond as fast as 
was compatible with high accuracy. They were given feedback as to their 
correctness after each response. 
Subjects. Eighteen subjects served in this experiment as a partial ful- 
fillment of a requirement for the introductory psychology course at Stan- 
ford University. 
Results 
Table 2 displays the mean reaction times and error rates for the various 
conditions in this experiment. The errors were excluded in calculating 
the mean reaction times. There are a total of 108 (18 subjects X 6 trials) 
observations per condition. An analysis of variance was performed using 
as data each subject’s mean reaction time for each condition. The analysis 
was a factorial design with three fixed effects: truth, number of proposi- 
tions per location, and number of propositions per person. The subject 
factor was a random effect and was used as the source of the error 
estimate. The three fixed effects were all significant-truth (F( 1,17) = 
6.57, p < .025), location ( F( 2,34) = 6.95, p < .OOl ), and person 
(F( 2,34) = 3.54, p < .05). N one of the interactions reached statistical 
significance. 
Of particular interest is the effect of number of propositions per con- 
cept. Averaging over trues and falses and collapsing the person and loca- 
tion effects together, subjects are 94 msec slower to judge a probe prop- 
osition when the concept (either person or location) is involved in three 
rather than one study proposition. This clearly suggests a search in long- 
term memory through the propositions attached to the person and loca- 
tion concepts. Although there are some reversals in Table 2, the general 
trend in going down rows or across columns is a systematic increase in 
reaction times. There are 36 possible comparisons and 32 are in the 
correct direction. The effect of one vs three propositions is actually larger 
for trues (119 msec) than for falses (69 msec) although this difference 
is not significant. The fact that trues show a greater effect is difficult to 
reconcile with a self-terminating search model such as the one to be 
presented later in this paper. 
Another result of interest is the fact that the effect of number of prop- 
ositions is approximately equal for the person dimension (93 msec) as 
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for the location dimension (96 msec). The next two experiments are 
designed to investigate under what conditions this symmetry could be 
maintained. This question is important in deciding between two classes 
of search models for long-term memory: the single-access model and the 
multiple-access model. The single-access model claims that the subject 
only accesses memory from one concept (either the person or location in 
this experiment) and searches memory from that concept. In contrast, 
the multiple-access model assumes the subject enters memory from all 
concepts and searches simultaneously from all concepts. This multiple- 
access model is suggested by the symmetric increase in reaction time with 
number of propositions per person or per location, Clearly, the multiple- 
access model predicts reaction time is equally a function of amount of 
search from the person and from the location. Plowever, a single-access 
model could produce this symmetry if it assumed subjects vary whether 
they enter from the person or the location, producing average effects 
that are equal. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
To account for Expt 1, the single-access model must assume that the 
subject was equally likely to access memory from the person or location. 
This is not an implausible assumption for the training procedures of Expt 
1. The subjects were probed with questions both of the form Who’s in 
the park? and Where are the hippies? The subject went on to the verifi- 
cation phase of the experiment only after he could consistently answer 
these questions correctly. As a result the subject was forced to build up 
a memory structure that he could access from either the person or the 
location. 
The single-access model would expect different results if the subject 
had been trained only with questions of the form Where are the hippies? 
Subjects should be biased to access memory from the person. Therefore, 
the more potent variable in the data should be number of propositions 
per person. By similar reasoning, the location dimension should be more 
potent if the subject were trained to retrieve from location probes such 
as Who is in the park? In contrast, the strong version of the multiple- 
access model expects no effect due to training procedure because memory 
is always accessed from all concepts in the proposition. 
Experiment 2 was conducted to test for this interaction between train- 
ing procedure and the relative potency of the person vs location dimen- 
sion A different group of nine subjects served in each of the two training 
procedures to partially fulfill a requirement of the introductory psy- 
chology course at Stanford. The experiment in which they participated 
was identical in procedure to Expt 1 with two exceptions, First, there 
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were the new training procedures described above. Second, subjects 
were tested on the same sequences of 150 reaction-time trials twice. Thus 
each subject contributed 12 observations to each cell in a data matrix 
like Table 2. 
Results 
The reaction times and error rates are presented in Table 3 classified 
according to type of training (recall to person probe only or to location 
probe only), truth, and number of propositions per person and location. 
There are a potential of 108 observations (9 subjects X 12 observations) 
contributing to each cell. An analysis of variance was performed on these 
data similar to the one used in Expt 1. The only difference was that 
training procedure was B between-subjects variable. Again, there were 
significant main effects of truth ( F( 1,16) = 8.74, p < .Ol ), number of 
propositions per person (F( 2,32) = 9.63, p < .OOl), and number of 
propositions per location (F( 2,32) = 33.47, p < .OOl). 
The training variable was not significant in its main effect or in any 
of its interactions. The effects of the two dimensions are about equal 
under either training procedure. The effect of one vs three propositions 
per person is 169 msec for subjects trained with the person probe. For the 
same subjects, the location effect is actually slightly greater-172 msec. 
For location-trained subjects, the effect of the person dimension is 92 
msec and the effect of the location dimension is 116 msec. So location- 
trained subjects show about 70 msec less of an effect for either dimension, 
but there is no apparent interaction between training procedure and 
potency of the dimensions. The interaction between training conditions 
and location dimension is not significant (F(2,32) = .78) nor is the 
interaction between training and the person dimension ( F( 2,32) = 1.37). 
The reason approximately 70-msec effects are not significant is that they 
involve a between-subjects contrast. Thus, the apparent difference in 
training procedures reflects the variability between individual subjects 
with respect to how much they are affected by an increase in number of 
propositions per concept. The failure of the training procedure to have 
any affect on the potency of the two dimensions is quite important. It 
indicates that both storage and retrieval of propositional information is 
largely independent of the procedures under which the information is 
learned. This fact will have to be incorporated into a final model for this 
paradigm. 
The interaction between the person and location dimension reached 
statistical significance (F( 4,64) = 2.82, p < .05). This reflects the fact 
that the effects of one variable are larger for larger values of the other 
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or number per location) is held at 1 and the other varied from I to 3, the 
mean effect is 40 msec, when held at 2 the mean effect is 108 msec, and 
when held at 3, the mean effect is 265 msec. A contrast testing for this 
trend is quite significant (F( 1,64) = 7.86, p < .Ol) while the residual 
variance in the person-by-location interaction not accounted for by the 
contrast (F( 3,64) = 1.14) is not. There had been a similar effect in Expt 
1 with mean effects of 67, 37, and 177 msec, but the trend did not reach 
statistical significance. This trend to larger effects of one variable at larger 
values of another will prove to be an important piece of information in 
guiding the choice of a retrieval model. 
The other significant interaction in this experiment was between truth 
and number of propositions per location (F( 2,32) = 4.14, p < .05). The 
effect of 1 vs 3 propositions per location for falses was much larger (191 
msec) than for trues (98 msec). A contrast testing for this difference is 
quite significant (F( 1,32) = 8.26, p < .Ol). This nearly two-to-one dif- 
ference suggests a self-terminating search. However, the effect of 
trues vs falses on the person dimension was not nearly so large. The 
mean effect for falses was 135 msec and for trues it was 127 msec. 
Since the same block of 150 trials was repeated twice, it is possible 
to compare performance in the first vs second half of the experiment. 
There is a highly significant speed-up with mean reaction time 1277 msec 
in the first half and 1033 msec in the second half (F ( 1,16) = 14.50, p < 
.005). The general relationships between conditions were maintained in 
both halves of the experiment. In particular, the effect of number of 
propositions was obtained in both halves although smaller in the second 
half. The mean effect of 1 vs 3 propositions was 172 msec in the first 
half and 100 msec in the second half. 
It is informative to compare the data for the false sentences in the two 
blocks of 150 trials. Each false sentence was repeated three times in a 
block, so one might suspect that the false sentences were becoming “fa- 
miliar” by the second block. The false sentences behaved like the trues. 
The falses showed a 218-msec decrease in mean reaction time from 
block 1 to block 2. The effect of 1 vs 3 propositions per concept decreased 
from 197 to 131 msec. These facts rule out the possibility that subjects 
are using a strength model for memory search of the variety proposed 
by Atkinson and Juola ( 1972). According to that sort of model, subjects 
will accept a sentence as true if it is sufficiently familiar, search memory 
if it is less familiar, and reject the sentence as false if it is sufficiently 
unfamiliar. This model expects as falses are repeated that reaction times 
will increase and also the effect of number of propositions will increase. 
This is because the familiarity is increased, making the probability greater 
that subjects will have to search memory. While this sort of strength 
462 JOHN ROBERT ANDERSON 
model is ruled out, the general decrease in search rates suggests there 
are strength effects of a different variety operating in this situation. 
EXPERIMENT 3 
Experiment 2 had indicated that retrieval of information was inde- 
pendent of the conditions that existed during the acquisition of the in- 
formation. Specifically, it was not possible to bias the relative potency 
of the person and location dimensions by use of training procedures. The 
experiment had been performed to test the single-access model which 
seemed to expect subjects would access memory only from the concept 
they had been trained with. The multiple-access model had expected 
subjects would access memory from both concepts. 
Experiment 3 was an attempt to manipulate the relative potency of 
the two dimensions in such a way that the multiple-access model would 
expect an effect. The experiment permitted the subject to access the 
location concept before the person concept or vice versa. If one concept 
could be accessed in memory before another, search could begin from 
that concept before the other and reaction time would be more a function 
of the number of propositions attached to the head-start concept. 
The training procedures in this experiment were identical to those 
of Expt 1. The difference concerned the reaction time testing phase of 
the experiment. Approximately 1 set before the probe sentence appeared 
on the screen, the experimenter told the subject the person or the loca- 
tion, or said the word none. Thus, if the subject were to verify A hippie 
is in the park, he would hear one of hippie, park, or none. The expecta- 
tion was that if the subject were precued with the person, he would be 
able to access that concept in memory and ready a search process from 
that concept before the sentence appeared. Upon presentation of the 
sentence, the search from this person node could begin before the search 
from the location node. In this way, the subject is given a “head start” 
from one concept. Consequently, when precued with the person, time to 
search memory should be more influenced by the number of propositions 
leading from that concept. For the same reason, when precued with the 
location, there should be a greater effect of the location dimension. In the 
control condition in which the subject is precued with none, there should 
be an equal effect of both dimensions. Further, verification times should 
be much slower in the control condition because it does not have the 
advantage of a head start in its search from one of the concepts. 
The process model underlying these predictions assumes that the sub- 
ject’s verification time can be divided into a number of additive com- 
ponents, These components are (a) a time to read the sentence, (b) the 
time to access a concept in memory, (c) the time to search from that 
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concept, and (d) the time to generate a response. Component (b) is 
eliminated for the precued concept. As soon as the sentence is read, 
search can begin from that concept. In this way the search from the 
precued concept has a head start over the search from the noncued con- 
cept which can only begin after that concept is accessed in memory. 
The precuing variable was manipulated within subjects. Each subject 
went twice through the sequence of 150 test sentences used in Expts 1 
and 2. For each subject, one-third of the propositions were precued with 
person, one-third with location, and one-third with none. Three separate 
cueing sequences were constructed to counterbalance over subjects the 
assignment of cueing conditions to sentences. There were 54 experimental 
conditions in a completely within-subject, factorial design-three levels 
of the person dimension, three of the location, two values of truth, and 
three cueing conditions. Each subject contributed four observations to 
each condition. There were 92 filler sentences. Twenty-seven subjects 
participated in this experiment as partial fulfillment of a requirement 
in the introductory psychology course at Yale University. 
Results 
The mean reaction times in milliseconds for the 54 conditions of the 
experiment are displayed in Table 4. An analysis of variance, similar 
in design to that for Expt 1, was performed on the data. Again, there 
were significant main effects of truth (F( 1,26) = 25.38, p < .OOl), the 
person dimension (F( 2,52) = 20.12, p < .OOl), and the location dimen- 
sion (F( 2,52) = 7.00, p < .025). P recueing produced a very significant 
(F(2,52) = 162.04, p < .OOl) speedup in subject reaction times. Sub- 
jects were on the average 254 msec faster when precued. This is similar 
to the 250-msec advantage found by Freedman and Loftus (1971) when 
they precued with a category, 
The expected interaction between cueing condition and the location 
dimension was only marginally significant (F( 4,104) = 2.35; p < .lO). 
The effect of one vs three propositions per location is largest when pre- 
cued with location ( 120 msec), next largest when precued with the per- 
son ( 89 msec), and least in the control condition (78 msec) . Although 
the interaction is not significant (F( 4,104) = 1.05) between cueing con- 
ditions and the effect of the person dimension, the ordering of the effect 
across conditions is as expected. The biggest effect occurs when subjects 
are precued with person ( 110 msec), next biggest in the control condition 
( 78 msec), and least with location precueing (60 msec). Averaging to- 
gether the effects of location and person precueing, the average effect 
for the cued dimension is 115 msec, and for the noncued dimension it 
is 75 msec. The significance of this 40-msec difference can be evaluated 
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TABLE 4 
Results from IXxpt 3 
A. Precue with none 
Trues 
No. of propositions per person 
F&es 
No. of propositions per person 
1 2 3 Mean 
B. Precue with person 
Trues 
1 2 3 Mean 
137.5 1480 1469 1 1441 
Falses 
No. of propositions per person No. of propositions per person 
C. Precue wit,h location 
Trues Fnlses 
No. of propositions per person No. of propositions per person 
1 2 3 Mean 1 2 3 Mean 
1 954 1042 1083 1026 1 1044 1105 1031 1060 
No. of 
proposi- 2 1121 1202 1128 1150 2 1221 1160 1284 1222 
Cons per 
location 
3 1066 1128 1168 1121 3 1132 1285 1201 1206 
Mean 1047 1124 1126 1099 JIean 1132 1183 1172 1163 
using the subject X person X location X cueing interaction as an error 
term. The difference in only marginally significant (F( 1,208) = 3.10, 
p < .lO). It is puzzling how precueing can have such a large effect on 
overall reaction times but such a weak effect on search rates. 
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None of the other interactions approached statistical significance. None- 
theless, it is worthwhile to note some of the nonsignificant comparisons. 
The effect of the location dimension (96 msec) was only slightly larger 
than the effect of the person dimension (83 msec). The average effect of 
number of propositions for falses (103 msec) is larger than for trues (75 
msec). The other interesting comparison concerns the effect of varying 
one dimension (either person or location) from one to three propositions 
for different values of the other dimension. The effect of one dimension 
is 107 msec when the other dimenson is held at one, 89 msec when it is 
held at two, and 71 msec held at three. Thus, the trend, while very weak, 
is towards lesser effects of one dimension for higher values of the other. 
This is just the opposite of strong trends obtained in Expts 1 and 2. In 
Expt 2, the effect had been quite significant. 
A RETRIEVAL MODEL 
Having now examined the particulars of each experiment, a model 
will be presented that captures the main trends in the experiments. To 
facilitate an evaluation of this model, Table 5 presents the means of the 
reaction times obtained in Expts 1 and 2 and in the control condition of 
Experiment 3.” Overall there are 63 subjects contributing 432 observa- 
tions to each of the IS conditions displayed in Table 5. 
The following model is proposed for the retrieval processes that sub- 
jects were performing in these experiments:3 It is assumed that in order 
to determine whether a proposition is stored in memory, the subject ac- 
cesses memory from all the concepts in the proposition. To determine 
whether the target proposition is attached to a concept, the subject must 
serially search through the propositions attached to the concept. This 
assumption of a serial search through propositions is consistent with the 
strongest and most consistent trend in the data-the increase in reaction 
time with number of propositions attached to person or location. This 
increase with number of propositions per concept is highly stable across 
subjects. Since sentences are assigned to different conditions for different 
subjects, the trends are also highly stable across sentences. For instance, 
for 58 of the 63 subjects, the [l,l] cell is faster than the [3,3]. This 
* For sake of brevity, I will not present a model for the pre-cue conditions of 
Expt 3. However, such a model is available and the interested reader should write 
to me. 
’ This model was first developed by Anderson & Bower ( 1973; Chap. 12) as part 
of our theory of long-term memory, HAM. These three experiments were designed to 
test certain aspects of that theory. Other tests appear in Thorndyke & Bower 
( 1974). Both Anderson & Bower and Thorndyke & Bower are concerned with the 
details of how a proposition is represented and searched. Such details will not be 
considered here, however, because these experiments are not sensitive to the details 
of representation. Rather, whole propositions will be considered as the units of analysis. 
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orderly increase in verification times reduces the credibility of a Quillian- 
like model (see Quillian, 1969) which posits that search proceeds in 
parallel along all paths from a concept, unaffected by the number of 
paths. Rather, increasing the number of paths (propositions) out of a 
concept results in marked increases in verification time. The overall 
effect in Table 5, comparing the [l,l] and [3,3] cells, is of the order of 
250 msec, which is very large on a base reaction time of just over 1 sec. 
While this effect is not compatible with a Quillian-like parallel model, 
it is compatible with a parallel model whose search rate is slower in 
proportion to the number of paths searched (see Townsend, 1971). 
While search is serial from a particular concept, it is assumed that 
a subject can access memory in parallel from a number of concepts. 
There were four principal sources of support for this assumption in these 
experiments. First, there is the symmetric effect obtained of the location 
and person dimensions. Second, there is a failure of Expt 2 to find any 
effect of training on the relative potency of the two dimensions. Third, 
there is the result obtained in Expt 1 and 2 (but not Expt 3) that the 
effect of one dimension was greater for larger values of the other di- 
mension. To appreciate why the multiple-access model expects this re- 
sult, consider the fact that there are two search processes proceeding in 
parallel and that the search time will be determined by the fastest. 
Clearly, the search time will be principally (but not completely) affected 
by the process that has the fewest proportions to search. Therefore, when 
the number of propositions is held at one, there can be little effect of 
varying the number of propositions for the other concept from one to 
three. There is much more “room” for an effect when one concept is 
being held constant at three propositions. 
It is unfortunate that a reverse effect was obtained in Expt 3. That 
reversal was small and insignificant and should probably be regarded 
as a random deviation from an effect in the opposite direction. That is, 
the effect of 1 vs 3 propostions for one dimension was 36 msec less when 
the other dimension was held at three than when it was held at one. The 
.05 confidence limits for the effect are from +65 to - 137 msec. There- 
fore, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the true effect in Expt 3 was 
positive. Similarly, Expt 1 found a positive effect of 110 msec but could 
not reject the hypothesis that the true effect was zero or negative. Only 
in Expt 2, where the obtained effect was +215 msec, could we reject (at 
the -01 confidence level) the hypothesis that the true effect was zero or 
negative. Thus, the only possible conclusion consistent with all three 
experiments is that the true effect is positive. 
The multiple-access model conceives of the overall retrieval process 
as a race between the person and location search processes, The one way 
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to affect the relative potency of the person and location dimensions would 
be by giving one search process a head start in the race. This is what 
was done in Expt 3 by precueing, and the desired effect was obtained: 
The precued dimension showed a greater effect of number of proposi- 
tions. This is the fourth and final piece of evidence indicating the mul- 
tiple-access model. Unfortunately, this effect was only of marginal sta- 
tistical significance. 
The obvious alternative to the multiple-access model is the single-access 
model, which assumes memo’ry is searched from just one concept. This 
model can only deal with the symmetric effects of the person and location 
dimensions by the ad hoc assumption of an equal probability of accessing 
memory from either concept. The failure of the training procedure in 
Expt 2 to affect this symmetry strains the credibility of that assumption. 
Finally, the single-access model has no way to explain the increasing 
effect of one dimension at higher values of the other. This interaction is 
quite strong in the average data of Table 5: When one variable is fixed 
at one proposition, a change in the other from one to three produces a 
71-msec increase in reaction time; when fixed at two, the increase is 101 
msec; and when fixed at three, it is 186 msec. Such an interaction em- 
barrasses the single-access model because it assumes that on any partic- 
ular trial a subject only searches from one concept. 
The final theoretical decision is whether subjects terminate search as 
soon as they find the target proposition or whether they search through 
all the propositions attached to a concept. This is the classical question 
of exhaustive versus self-terminating search (see Sternberg, 1969). A 
self-terminating model expects a lesser effect of number of propositions 
for trues than for falses. The average effect in Table 5 of one vs three 
propositions for trues is 102 msec, while for falses it is 138 msec. Although 
there is less of an effect for trues, the ratio of effects is 1.35 to 1, which 
is considerably less than the 2 to 1 effect commonly expected for self- 
terminating models. 
One should note, however, that there is a strong positive correlation 
(r = .83) b t e e w en reaction times and error rates for the false data 
whereas there is no correlation for the true data (T = -.12). This dif- 
ference between true and false data becomes important if one considers 
the speed-accuracy tradeoff (see Pachella, 1974) which appears to 
be ubiquitous in reaction-time experiments. The phenomenon is that 
subjects’ reaction times decrease whenever their error rates increase. 
With generally low error rates such as those obtained in this experiment, 
small increases in error rates can produce marked decreases in reaction- 
time. Since longer reaction times in the false data were correlated with 
higher error rates, this means that the reaction times would be even 
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larger in long reaction time conditions if subjects were working at the 
same accuracy as they did in the conditions that produced shorter reaction 
times. The consequence of this speed-accuracy tradeoff and the differing 
correlations for trues and for falses is that the obtained ratio of effects for 
trues vs falses is underestimated. 
There are no adequate methods for dealing with the speed-accuracy 
tradeoff except to develop a model of how errors are made. The data 
here are inappropriate for developing such a model. It would have been 
necessary to run subjects under different deadline conditions. So I will 
simply provide separate fits of this model to trues and to falses. A self- 
terminating model will be assumed for trues because intuitively this is 
a more reasonable search algorithm. Given the different correlations be- 
tween errors and reaction times, this decision to provide separate fits 
is clearly justified. However, because of it, the question of self-terminat- 
ing vs exhaustive search is left empirically undecided. Research is now 
underway to obtain data more suitable to testing a model of errors which, 
as a consequence, will permit a decision on whether long-term memory 
is searched in an exhaustive or self-terminating fashion. 
To summarize the search model: The subject simultaneously accesses 
and searches memory from all concepts in the proposition, However, the 
search from one concept is a serial search of all propositions involving 
that concept, looking for the target proposition. The search terminates 
as soon as any search process uncovers the target or exhausts the proposi- 
tions attached to it. Thus search time is determined by the fastest of 
a number of racing processes. 
THE MATHEMATICAL MODEL 
I have now described verbally the search model and indicated how 
it accounts for the main trends in the data. What remains to be done 
is to formalize methematically that model’s predictions for these experi- 
ments. Then one may obtain a quantitative comparison of the model’s 
predictions and the actual data. Suppose that the mean time to search 
a proposition is QS and suppose i propositions must be searched from the 
person and i propositions from the location. The mean time to search 
from the person concept alone would be ior and from the location alone 
ia. However, since searches are proceeding from both in parallel and 
search time is determined by the fastest, we would expect mean search 
time to be less than either ia or ia. In order to determine the mean time 
of the fastest of a number of processes, a characterization is needed of the 
variability in the times for each process. Therefore, the following mode1 
is proposed for the variability of search times from a concept. It has three 
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features to commend it: (a) It is not unreasonable a priori; (b) It is 
mathematically tractable; and (c) it predicts the data. 
In understanding the following development, the reader should keep 
in mind that there are three levels of analysis: First, there is the question 
of the variability in times to examine one proposition. Second, there is 
the question of how search times for individual propositions become 
compounded together to yield a model of the variability in times to 
search n propositions attached to a concept. Finally, a number of search 
processes are proceeding in parallel from all concepts in a test proposi- 
tion. A characterization is needed of the variability in the “winning” time 
of these processes. 
The natural assumption is that the time, t, to search one proposition 
has an exponential probability density, i.e., 
f(t) = (l/a)@“. (1) 
The density in Eq. (1) has mean cx which is the time to search one prop- 
osition. How should one proceed from Eq. (1) to an equation giving the 
density of times to search n propositions? There are two obvious density 
functions-one assumes complete independence and the other complete 
dependence among the search times for individual propositions. Suppose 
that, within the search from a concept, time to search one proposition is 
independent of the times to search the other propositions. Then the 
density of times to search n propositions would be a gamma distribution 
with parameters n and (Y. There is no tractable characterization of the 
fastest of an arbitrary number of gammas which discourages the assump- 
tion that times to search individual propositions are independent. 
In contrast, a complete-dependence assumption leads to a workable 
model. Assume that a particular search process examines propositions at 
a constant rate but that the rates vary across applications of search 
processes to particular concepts. Let r be the search rate, i.e., the number 
of propositions searched per millisecond. It follows from Eq. (1) that T 
has the following density: 
g(r) = (1/0+)e”‘a. (2) 
From Eq. (2) we can derive the density of t,, the time to search n prop- 
ositions. Using the fact t, = n/r and computing a change of variable, 
Eq. (3) may be obtained from Eq. (2) : 
f&) = (l/an)t+‘““. (3) 
Equation (3) describes a family of exponential densities. For each value 
of n, there is a different exponential with the mean ~.cY. Equation (1) is a 
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special case of Eq. (3) w h ere n = 1. Equation (3) could have been as- 
serted directly, but the derivation through Eq. (2) makes two features 
salient: (a) The sample space for the density in Eq. (3) is searches from 
concepts, and (b) within a search, the times to search individual proposi- 
tions are identical. 
It is easy to characterize the fastest of an arbitrary number of expo- 
nentials. The fastest of i exponentials with rates r,, rz, . . . , ri is also an 
exponential, but with rate r1 + r? + * * . + Tie Using this fact, Eq. (4) 




-& + & + . . + -& 
(4) 
1; 
Equation (4) is central to the predictions of the model for verification 
data. 
To review the significant features of this search model: 
(a) The search involves a mixture of serial and parallel processes. 
Within the search from one concept, search is serial, examining one 
proposition after another. However, different search processes proceed 
in parallel from all concepts of a probe proposition. 
(b) The model is self-terminating in two senses. First, a particular 
search process terminates immediately upon finding a matching memory 
structure. Second, the search of memory terminates as soon as the first 
of the racing processes comes to a conclusion. 
(c) The model involves a mixture of independent and dependent 
processes. The times for searching individual propositions from a concept 
are totally dependent. The times for processes from different concepts 
are totally independent. The assumption of exponential distributions of 
search times from one concept is not that critical. I have worked through 
the assumption of the gamma distribution and obtained similar pre- 
dictions. However, the theoretical expressions are terribly complicated 
and specific to this experiment. In contrast, Eq. (4) is general and can 
be used for any retrieval experiment. 
PREDICTIONS 
With this development of the race model, it is now possible to obtain 
predictions for the data in Table 5. It is easier to work out the predic- 
tions for the falses than for the trues. Suppose that the subject must 
exhaust i propositions from the person concept or else i from the location 
to determine that the sentence is false. Derived from Eq. (4), the fol- 
lowing equation gives the expected time to falsify an i,i proposition: 
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Fi,i = Kp + ’ 
&+I& 
= KF + ij (YF. 
z+j (5) 
In Eq. (5) K F re p resents the constant time associated with encoding the 
sentence and generating a false response. It does not involve memory 
search and hence is independent of i and j. The parameter ore is the time 
to search a proposition for falses. Because of the pattern of correlations 
between errors and reaction times, separate u parameters are being 
estimated for trues and for falses. 
In deriving predictions for trues, it is necessary to consider the order 
in which the propositions involving a concept are considered and the 
position of the target proposition in that ordering. If the target proposi- 
tion is considered mth among the i person propositions and nth among 
the i location propositions, then the search time for the target proposition 
will be the same as for a [m,n] false. This is because search from a 
concept is self-terminating. As a simplifying assumption, suppose all 
combinations of m and n (i.e., all combination of positions in the two 
orderings) up to i and i are equally likely. From this assumption a 
prediction for the true sentences can be derived: 
The constant KT in Eq. (6) represents the time to encode the sentence 
and to generate a true response. The parameter 01~ is the estimate for 
trues of time to search a proposition. 
Figure 1 illustrates the predictions of the model together with the 
data from Table 5. In Fig. 1, i gives the number of propositions per 
person and i the number of propositions per location. The parameters 
were obtained by means of multiple regression analysis, and their values 
are K, = 844 msec, K, = 1053 msec, CY~ = 518 msec, and a~~ = 280 msec. 
The model clearly captures the main trends in the data. The correlation 
between prediction and data is .95. However, there are a number of 
seriously discrepant points. Each of these points is associated with a 
reversal in Table 5 of the ordering of reaction times down rows or across 
columns. There are four such reversals: In the true matrix, the (1,2) 
point is 14 msec larger than the (1,3) point, and the (3,l) point is equal 
to the (3,2) point. In the false matrix, the (2,2) point is 65 msec larger 
than the (3,2) point, and the (2,3) point is 6 msec longer than the 
(3,3) point. Thus, the source of these discrepancies is not in the mul- 
tiple-access assumption or in the self-terminating assumption. Any model 
that assumed an orderly increase in reaction time with number of 
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FIG. 1. Comparison of the model’s predictions with the average data in Table 5. 
The solid lines are the predicted times and the dotted lines the observed. The 
variable i indexes the number of propositions per person and i the number of propo- 
sitions per location. 
propositions would face these difficulties. However, the overall trend 
in favor of this assumption is very strong, and it seems unwise to give 
up the assumption on the basis of four discrepant comparisons. The 
hypothesis is confirmed by the 32 other possible comparisons in Table 5 
between pairs of reaction times (along rows or down columns of the 
matrices ) . 
CONCLUSIONS 
The general force of these experiments has been to support two as- 
sumptions of the Anderson and Bower (1973) model of retrieval from 
long-term memory. These assumptions are the serial search of proposi- 
tions leading from any one concept and the multiple-access in parallel 
to memory from all concepts in the proposition. The correlation between 
reaction times and error rates vitiates any conclusions about self- 
terminating search. There were disturbing inconsistencies of detail from 
experiment to experiment and perplexing misorderings of conditions. 
In part, these are chance perturbations that can be expected across 
experiments with large numbers of conditions. The general trends are 
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clear, however, and consistent with the data in Anderson and Bower 
( 1973; Chapter 12)) Thorndyke & Bower ( 1974), and more recent 
unpublished data of my own. These general findings, then, are ones 
that will have to be reckoned with by any theory of long-term memory. 
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